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This paper contributes to the discussion on Separate Accounting versus Formula 
Apportionment in the corporate income taxation of multinational enterprises (MNEs). The 
innovation of the analysis is that we consider a general equilibrium tax competition model 
with an endogenously determined world interest rate. Under the principle of Separate 
Accounting, it turns out that corporate tax rates may be inefficiently low or high, while under 
Formula Apportionment corporate tax rates are always inefficiently low. These results are 
true independent of whether the number of countries is small or large. They reverse the 
insights obtained by previous studies under the assumption of an exogenously given world 
interest rate. 
JEL Code: H7, H73. 







Department of Economics 






Faculty of Economics and Management 
University of Magdeburg 








May 10, 2008 
We would like to thank participants of the CESifo Area Conference on Public Sector 
Economics in Munich, Jay Wilson and Matthias Wrede for their helpful discussion. The usual 
disclaimer applies. 1 Introduction
There are basically two alternative principles in the taxation of multinational enter-
prises (MNEs). The ﬁrst principle is Separate Accounting. Under such a taxation
system, corporate income of a MNE is taxed by the tax code of the country in which
the MNE the income declares. The second principle is Formula Apportionment. This
taxation system is mainly characterized by two properties. The tax bases of all sub-
sidiaries of the MNE are ﬁrst consolidated and then apportioned to the taxing countries
according to a predetermined formula that usually reﬂects the MNE’s property, sales
and payroll shares in the respective countries. While Separate Accounting is in oper-
ation at the international level, some countries like the U.S., Canada, Germany and
Switzerland apply Formula Apportionment at the national level.
The European Commission (2001) presented plans to reform the corporate income
taxation of MNEs within the boarders of the European Union. The idea is to replace
the current system of Separate Accounting by Formula Apportionment. In 2004 the
European Commission set up the so-called Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base
Working Group in order to develop concepts for introducing a common European
tax base. Such a common tax base deﬁnition is seen as a prerequisite for introducing
Formula Apportionment. The European Council plans to decide on the introduction of
Formula Apportionment during 2008. These activities in the European Union brought
in its wake a heated discussion about the pros and cons of the two corporate taxation
principles both among politicians and among economists.
Our paper contributes to this discussion. Using a tax competition model with a rep-
resentative MNE and Leviathan governments, we investigate the eﬃciency properties
of the two tax principles by identifying ﬁscal externalities caused by the countries’ tax
policy. The innovation of the paper is that it uses a general equilibrium model. Such
an approach explicitly takes into account the world capital market where the interest
rate is endogenously determined. The advantage of the general equilibrium framework
is that it allows to consider large countries whose governments are aware of their eﬀects
on the world price of capital. And even for small countries, each of which takes the
interest rate as given, aggregate policy changes of all countries have an impact on the
interest rate when it is endogenously determined. Hence, a general equilibrium model
like ours is more appropriate to investigate the principles of Separate Accounting and
Formula Apportionment: Regardless of whether countries are large or small in the
above sense, taxation under both systems will have eﬀects on the interest rate which
1should be taken into account when evaluating the two principles in terms of eﬃciency.
This is particularly true as our analysis yields results that are detrimentally diﬀerent
from those obtained in previous studies under the assumption of a ﬁxed world interest
rate. Under Separate Accounting, it turns out that the cross country eﬀect of one
countries tax rate consists of a proﬁt shifting externality and a tax base externality.
The former states that a corporate tax rate increase in one country induces the MNE
to shift more proﬁt to other countries, thereby improving the tax base and tax revenue
in other countries. This externality is positive. The tax base externality reﬂects the
impact of one country’s tax rate on the other countries’ tax base and tax revenue via
changes in the quantities and prices of production inputs. A tax rate increase in one
country reduces capital demand in this country and raises investment in other countries
through a fall in the world interest rate. As consequence, there is a positive eﬀect on
the tax base and tax revenue in other countries. But the increase in investment is
accompanied by an increase in labor demand and wages which, in turn, reduces the
tax base and tax revenue in the other countries. Overall the tax base externality may
be positive or negative. Hence, the sign of the total cross country eﬀect of corporate
tax rates under Separate Accounting is ambiguous, leaving it open whether countries
end up with ineﬃcient over- or undertaxation.
Under Formula Apportionment, in contrast, corporate tax rates are unambiguously
too low. With consolidation and apportionment the cross country eﬀect of tax rates
can be decomposed into a formula externality and a tax base externality. As the proﬁt
shifting externality under Separate Accounting, the formula externality is positive: If
one country raises its tax rate the MNE reallocates capital and labor from this country
to other countries. In doing so, it reduces its tax burden by lowering the share of
the consolidated tax base assigned to the tax-increasing country and by increasing the
share of the consolidated tax base assigned to the other countries. As consequence,
the tax revenue in the other countries goes up. The tax base externality again reﬂects
the impact of one country’s tax rate on the other countries’ tax base and tax revenue
through changes in quantities and prices of production inputs. In contrast to Separate
Accounting, however, it is now the consolidated tax base that determines tax revenue
of the countries. Hence, the eﬀects via investment and wages cancel out and do not
inﬂuence the tax base. Only the reduction in the interest rate matters. It reduces
capital cost and increases the consolidated tax base and tax revenue in the other coun-
tries. Hence, the tax base externality under Formula Apportionment is unambiguously
positive and corporate tax rates will always fall short of their eﬃcient levels.
2These results reverse the insights obtained by previous studies. There is by now a
large number of studies investigating Separate Accounting versus Formula Apportion-
ment. Examples are McLure (1980), Mintz and Smart (2004) and Nielsen et al. (2003).
Our paper is closely related to Gordon and Wilson (1986), Eggert and Schjelderup
(2003), Wellisch (2004), Sørensen (2004), Nielsen et al. (2006), Riedel and Runkel
(2007), Pinto (2007), Pethig and Wagener (2008) and Eichner and Runkel (2008). But
in contrast to our approach, all these papers use partial equilibrium models with a
given world interest rate. Hence, the tax base externality under Separate Accounting
is missing since the increase in one country’s tax rate reduces only the MNE’s capital
and labor demand in this country, but neither the world interest rate nor the produc-
tion inputs in other countries. For the same reason, the eﬀects on the consolidated tax
base via changes in the production inputs do not cancel out, so the sign of the tax base
externality under Formula Apportionment becomes indeterminate. The basic insight
of previous studies is therefore that the corporate tax rates under Separate Accounting
are ineﬃciently low (due to the positive proﬁt shifting externality), whereas they may
be ineﬃciently low or high under Formula Apportionment (due to the indeterminate
sign of the tax base externality). These insights are detrimentally diﬀerent to those
derived in our framework under the assumption of an endogenous world interest rate.
We show that this diﬀerence in results prevails if we let the number of countries go to
inﬁnity and each country becomes small.
If we abstract from proﬁt shifting, our analysis of the Separate Accounting principle
is also related to the traditional literature on (capital) tax competition. For example,
Wilson (1985, 1986) and Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) establish ineﬃciently low
capital tax rates in a tax competition model with a large number of countries. This
result has been extended to settings with a small number of countries by Crombrugghe
and Tulkens (1990). Hoyt (1991) uniﬁes both approaches and shows that the race to
the bottom sharpens when the number of countries increases. The basic reason for
undertaxation in these studies is a positive capital ﬂight externality. If one country
increases its tax rate, capital ﬂows out of this country and thereby increases investment
in other countries. This externality is similar to our tax base externality under Separate
Accounting. In our framework, however, the tax base externality may be positive or
negative. The reason for this diﬀerence is that the above authors model capital taxes
as a (unit) wealth tax on capital, whereas we explicitly consider a tax on corporate
income. Hence, in our model there may be a negative eﬀect of one country’s tax rate
on the other countries’ tax base working through changes in labor demand and wages.
3The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the basic assumptions
of our model. Section 3 and 4 investigate the eﬃciency properties of corporate tax rates
under Separate Accounting and Formula Apportionment, and Section 5 concludes.
2 Basic Assumptions
Consider an economy with n ≥ 2 identical countries. We use i,j,h = 1,...,n as
country indices. There is a large number of MNEs operating a plant in each country.
The MNEs are structurally the same, so we restrict attention to a representative MNE.
In country i, the MNE produces a consumption good according to the production
function F(ki,ℓi) where ki is capital and ℓi is labor employed in the production of
country i. The production function F has the usual properties. It exhibits positive
and decreasing marginal returns to capital and labor, i.e. Fk,Fℓ > 0 and Fkk,Fℓℓ < 0. In
addition, capital and labor are supposed to be complements in the sense that Fℓk > 0.
As the previous literature on Separate Accounting versus Formula Apportionment,
we consider the case of decreasing returns to scale with respect to capital and labor.
This assumption implies that there is at least one ﬁxed factor in production (say,
entrepreneurial services) that generates economic rents. In the analysis of corporate
income taxation, the existence of economics rents is a useful property since these rents
represent the corporate income the governments try to tax.
The MNE may shift proﬁt between its subsidiaries. This can be done, for example,
by manipulating the subsidiaries’ debt equity structure, distorting transfer prices of
goods and services traded between the subsidiaries or distributing overhead cost be-
tween the subsidiaries. The speciﬁc shifting channel is immaterial for our purpose. We
simply model the eﬀect that proﬁt shifting changes the tax bases of the subsidiaries.
Formally, the variable si denotes the change in the tax base of the subsidiary located
in country i. If si > 0 (si < 0), then the tax base in country i goes up (down) since
the MNE shifts proﬁt to (from) country i. The shifting variables satisfy
X
j
sj = 0. (1)
This condition ensures that si represents shifting from or to country i and not a change
in the overall proﬁt of the MNE. Proﬁt shifting comes at a concealment cost that
reﬂects, for example, the expense for tax consultants and the MNE’s risk of being
detected by the tax authority illegally shifting income (e.g. Kant, 1998, Hauﬂer and
4Schjelderup, 2000). The concealment cost is represented by the U-shaped function
C(si) with C(0) = 0, sign{C′(si)} = sign{si} and C′′(si) > 0. Note that this mod-
eling implicitly assumes that one euro shifting between two subsidiaries causes cost in
both subsidiaries. This is a realistic assumption. For example, in their transfer pricing
regulation many countries force MNEs to document their transactions. This documen-
tation is required for each subsidiary, i.e. the subsidiary in country i has to document
the transaction even if the subsidiary in country j has already documented it. All
documentations are costly since they are usually done by diﬀerent tax consultants.1
For each unit of capital the MNE has to pay the world interest rate r. The user
cost of capital in country i therefore amounts to rki. Payroll in country i is wiℓi, where
wi stands for the local wage rate in country i. In order to deﬁne the tax base of the
MNE, we have to specify which factor cost is tax-deductible. In accordance with most
real world tax systems, we assume that payroll is fully deductible. In contrast, capital
cost may be partially deductible since the governments may grant partial depreciation
allowances only and/or allows the MNE to deduct the cost of debt ﬁnance but not the
cost of equity ﬁnance. We denote the fraction of capital cost that is deductible by the
parameter ρ ∈ [0,1]. The tax base of the MNE in country i is then given by
Φ
i = F(ki,ℓi) − ρrki − wiℓi + si. (2)
The tax base of the MNE in country i equals sales (output) adjusted by the deductible
capital and labor cost and by proﬁt shifting from or to country i.
The decisive diﬀerence of our model to previous studies on the comparison be-
tween Separate Accounting and Formula Apportionment is that we consider a general
equilibrium model. In our framework, not only the local wage rates are endogenously
determined, but also is the world interest rate. Formally, the wage rate in country i
follows from the local labor market equilibrium condition
ℓi = ¯ ℓ, (3)
which equates labor demand ℓi and labor endowment ¯ ℓ that is inelastically supplied.
Labor demand depends on the wage rates according to the MNE’s proﬁt maximization
which is considered below. The world interest rate is determined on the world capital
market which clears according to the condition
X
j
kj = n¯ k. (4)
1Most of our results are not aﬀected if a transaction is associated with cost in one subsidiary only.
5Equation (4) requires that world capital demand has to equal world capital supply,
where each country is assumed to have capital endowment ¯ k which it inelastically
supplies at the world capital market. Capital demand depends on the interest rate due
to the MNE’s proﬁt maximization considered in the next sections. Previous studies
partially consider the labor market (3), but our approach is the ﬁrst that takes into
account an endogenous world interest rate determined on the world capital market (4).
3 Separate Accounting
Proﬁt Maximization and Markets. Under Separate Accounting corporate income
is taxed in the country where the MNE it declares. Denoting by tj country j’s statutory












The MNE chooses investment, labor input and proﬁt shifting in order to maximize
after-tax proﬁt (5) subject to the constraint (1) and the tax base deﬁnition (2). In doing
so, it takes as given the tax rates and the factor prices. Denoting by λ the Lagrange
multiplier associated with (1), the ﬁrst-order conditions of proﬁt maximization read
(1 − ti)[Fk (ki,ℓi) − ρr] − r(1 − ρ) = 0, (6)
Fℓ (ki,ℓi) − wi = 0, (7)
(1 − ti) − C
′(si) + λ = 0. (8)
These conditions have the usual interpretation. Equation (6) and (7) equate the (net-
of-tax) marginal return to capital and labor to the respective (deductible) factor cost.
Equation (8) states that the MNE shifts proﬁt up to the point where the marginal
concealment cost equals the marginal shifting beneﬁt. This condition implies that
shifting to country i will be larger than shifting to country j if country i has the lower
tax rate, i.e. ti < tj implies C′(si) > C′(sj) and si > sj due to C′′( ) > 0. Together
with (1) it follows that there is proﬁt shifting from high-tax to low-tax countries as
long as non-zero tax rate diﬀerentials between countries exist.
Below we will analyze the tax competition game between the n countries. To
that end we need the comparative static eﬀects of tax rate changes on the MNE’s
investment, labor demand and proﬁt shifting decision. We follow previous studies and
restrict attention to symmetric equilibria with ti = t. Equations (1) – (4) and (6) – (8)
6then imply ki = ¯ k, ℓi = ¯ ℓ, wi = w, Φi = Φ and si = 0. Totally diﬀerentiating (1) – (4)








































nC′′ > 0, (12)
where i  = j. These expressions have a straightforward interpretation. A unilateral
increase in one country’s tax rate causes a rise in the tax burden in this country and,
thus, induces the MNE to reduce capital demand and the tax base in this country.
As consequence, the equilibrium world interest rate falls and investment in all other
countries goes up. Hence, the MNE reallocates capital from the tax-increasing country
to all other countries as formally shown by (9) and (10). Since labor is complementary
to capital (Fℓk > 0), decreases in capital call for a reduction in labor demand so that
the input factor labor becomes more abundant and the wage rate decreases. Thus, the
wage rate shrinks in the tax-increasing country but rises elsewhere as follows from (11).
Finally, (12) shows that if a country raises its tax rate, proﬁt shifting to this country
declines whereas proﬁt shifting to other countries increases.
Tax competition. We now turn to the tax competition game under Separate Ac-
counting. It is assumed that the governments of the countries behave non-cooperatively,
using tax rates as their strategic variables. We consider the case where each country’s
government chooses its corporate tax rate in order to maximize tax revenue. This as-
sumption reﬂects the idea of Leviathan governments which is often seen quite relevant,
in particular in the context of corporate taxation (e.g. Wilson 1999), and therefore
has frequently been used by previous studies on Separate Accounting versus Formula
Apportionment (e.g. Nielsen et al., 2006, and Pethig and Wagener, 2008).
Under the tax principle of Separate Accounting, a country’s tax revenue equals its
tax rate times the tax base. For country i we obtain
gi = tiΦ
i. (13)
Country i maximizes (13) with respect to its tax rate ti taken as given the tax rates
of the other countries. In doing so, it takes into account equations (9) – (12), i.e. the
7impact of its tax policy on the MNE’s behavior and on the local labor market as well
as on the world capital market. The latter eﬀect is the main diﬀerence of our analysis
to previous studies: In our model, each country is aware of its impact on the capital
market and the equilibrium interest rate. Only if the number of countries becomes
large and, thus, each country becomes small, the eﬀect of the individual country on
the world interest rate vanishes. Formally, this follows from (9) and n → ∞. As we
will see below, however, even such an extreme case is diﬀerent from assuming a ﬁxed r,
as done in previous studies, since the interest rate in our model is then still endogenous
and varies with aggregate policy changes.
The ﬁrst-order condition of country i’s tax revenue maximization is ∂gi/∂ti = 0. It
determines country i’s reaction function, i.e. its best response to the other countries’
tax rates. Solving the ﬁrst-order conditions of all n countries gives the equilibrium tax
rates of the tax competition game. As already mentioned above, we follow previous
studies and focus on a symmetric equilibrium with tax rates ti = ˜ t. Our main inter-
est is to assess the eﬃciency properties of ˜ t. This can be done by investigating the
ﬁscal externality which is represented by the eﬀect of country i’s tax rate on all other
countries’ tax revenues, i.e.
P
j =i ∂gj/∂ti. Starting from a symmetric equilibrium, the
ﬁscal externality reﬂects the tax revenue eﬀect of a coordinated tax rate increase. A
positive (negative) sign of the ﬁscal externality shows that tax coordination leads to an
increase (decrease) of tax revenue in each country and, thus, to a Pareto improvement
(deterioration) so that the equilibrium tax rate ˜ t is ineﬃciently low (high). In order to
determine the sign of the ﬁscal externality, we diﬀerentiate (13) and take into account





= (n − 1)
∂gj
∂ti
= ˜ t(n − 1)
∂Φj
∂ti
= (n − 1)PE + (n − 1)TE|SA, (14)
where





nC′′ > 0, (15)













˜ t(Fk − ρr)
n(1 − ˜ t)(1 − ρ˜ t)Fkk
￿
(1 − ρ˜ t)
￿
Fk − ρr − ¯ ℓFℓk
￿
− (1 − ˜ t)ρ¯ kFkk
￿
. (16)
According to (14) – (16), the total cross country eﬀect of country i’s tax rate on tax
revenue in country j  = i can be decomposed into two sub-externalities. The ﬁrst is the
proﬁt shifting externality PE in (15). If country i increases its tax rate ti, the MNE
8shifts more proﬁt to country j which enhances country j’s tax base and tax revenue.
The proﬁt shifting externality is positive and tends to ineﬃcient undertaxation. The
second externality is the tax base externality TE|SA in (16). This externality is consti-
tuted by three eﬀects that build on each other. First, increasing ti lowers the MNE’s
capital demand ki in country i. As consequence, world capital demand and, thus, the
price of capital represented by the interest rate r decrease. This has a positive eﬀect
on the tax base in country j as the MNE’s capital cost in country j becomes lower.
Second, the reduction in the interest rate r induces the MNE to increase investment
kj in country j.2 Hence, also this second eﬀect raises the tax base in country j. Third,
the increase in investment kj induces the MNE to demand more labor in country j
since capital and labor are complements. The wage rate wj in country j therefore goes
up with a raise in payroll and a drop in the tax base in country j as an end result.
Since the third eﬀect goes into the opposite direction of the ﬁrst and second eﬀect,
the sign of the tax base externality is ambiguous. To illustrate this point, consider
the special case of no deductibility of capital cost (ρ = 0) and a CES production
function F(k,ℓ) = [δkν + (1 − δ)ℓν]
µ
ν with δ ∈]0,1[,   ∈]0,1[ and ν ≤ 1. Note that
for the CES function the substitution elasticity η := 1/(1 − ν) is positive correlated
with the parameter ν. For notational convenience, we deﬁne K := δ¯ kν, L = (1 − δ)¯ ℓν
and Z := K + L. We can then write F = Z
µ
ν, Fk =  KZ
µ
ν −1/¯ k, Fℓ =  LZ
µ
ν −1/¯ ℓ,
Fkk = − [(1 −  )K + (1 − ν)L]KZ
µ
ν −2/¯ k2 and Fℓk =  (  − ν)KLZ
µ
ν −2/¯ k¯ ℓ. Inserting
this and ρ = 0 into (16) and deﬁning Ψ := ˜ t KZ
µ
ν −1/[n(1 − ˜ t)] > 0 yields
TE|SA = Ψ
K + (1 −   + ν)L
(1 −  )K + (1 − ν)L
. (17)
From (17) we infer that the tax base externality is positive as long as ν ≥ 0 or,
equivalently, η ≥ 1. For ν = 0 this parameter range covers as a special case the Cobb-
Douglas production function. However, if the parameter ν is suﬃciently negative, then
the tax base externality may become negative as well. This is intuitively plausible since
for a very small ν and, thus, a very small substitution elasticity η, capital and labor
are strong complements. In such a case, the above mentioned third eﬀect of country
i’s tax rate on country j’s tax base via the rise in the wage rate is quite large because
the increase in investment in country j induces the MNE to increase labor demand in
country j a lot. Hence, the third eﬀect may overcompensate the other two eﬀects and,
thus, may render the tax base externality negative pointing to overtaxation.
2The fall in r exerts also a positive eﬀect on investment ki in the tax-increasing country i. But
this eﬀect is more than compensated by the initial drop in ki.
9The possibly diﬀerent signs of the proﬁt shifting and tax base externalities prove
Proposition 1. Suppose the tax competition game under Separate Accounting attains
a symmetric Nash equilibrium with ti = ˜ t. Then the equilibrium corporate tax rate ˜ t
may be ineﬃciently low or high.
It is important to compare this insight with the result obtained by previous studies
referred to in the Introduction. Previous authors came to the conclusion that under
Separate Accounting tax revenue maximizing governments set their corporate tax rates
ineﬃciently low. The reason for the diﬀerence to our result in Proposition 1 is that
previous studies proceed on the assumption of a ﬁxed interest rate. If r is exogenously
given, none of the above mentioned three eﬀects of country i’s tax rate on country
j’s tax base is present since the decline of the MNE’s investment in country i is then
followed neither by a fall in the interest rate nor by an increase in investment and the
wage rate in country j. Hence, with a ﬁxed interest rate there is no tax base externality,
and the remaining proﬁt shifting externality results in ineﬃcient undertaxation. As
our proposition shows, however, this may no longer be true, if we explicitly consider
the world capital market that endogenously determines the interest rate.
One may conjecture that this diﬀerence to previous studies is due to an implicit
assumption that each country is suﬃciently large in order to take into account its
eﬀect on the world interest rate. But the following proposition (proven in Appendix B)
shows that our result prevails if n grows without bounds so that each country becomes
inﬁnitesimally small and no longer has an eﬀect on the interest rate.
Proposition 2. Suppose the tax competition game under Separate Accounting attains
a symmetric Nash equilibrium with ti = ˜ t. Then Proposition 1 is true also for small






= −sign {PE + TE|SA}.
It is true that for an inﬁnite number of countries the impact of country i’s tax rate on
the interest rate and, thus, on investment and wages in an individual country j  = i
converges to zero. Formally, TE|SA in (16) vanishes if n → ∞. However, if the number
of countries grows without bounds, the eﬀect of country i’s tax rate on the aggregate
number of countries is still non-zero. This follows from (14) where TE|SA is multiplied
by n−1 which represents the number of competitors of country i. Put diﬀerently, the
tax base externality inﬂicted by country i’s tax rate on a single competitor becomes
10inﬁnitesimally small when the number of countries becomes larger and larger, but the
tax base externality inﬂicted on the aggregate number of competitors is still there
and ambiguous in sign. This is the reason why Proposition 1 is also true for small
countries. Consistently with this argument, the second part of Proposition 2 shows
that the deviation of the equilibrium tax rate from its eﬃcient level becomes larger
if the number of countries increases. This is true independent of whether we have
ineﬃcient undertaxation (PE + TE|SA > 0) or overtaxation (PE + TE|SA < 0).
It may ﬁnally be worthwhile to compare our results under Separate Accounting to
the insights of the (capital) tax competition literature already referred to in the Intro-
duction. This literature identiﬁes the so-called capital ﬂight externality that reﬂects
the increase in country j’s investment upon an increase in country i’s tax rate. It is
positive and unambiguously points to ineﬃciently low tax rates. This eﬀect is similar
to the comparative static eﬀect in (10). As shown by Proposition 1 and 2, however, in
our framework countries may end up with ineﬃcient overtaxation. The reason for this
diﬀerence is that we model corporate taxation as a tax on taxable income whereas the
(capital) tax competition literature uses the short cut of a (unit) wealth tax on capital,
i.e. tax payments there amounts to tiki. Hence, in the previous literature there is no
cross country eﬀect on tax bases working through an increase in wages. This eﬀect is
the driving force behind possible overtaxation in our framework.
4 Formula Apportionment
Proﬁt Maximization and Markets. We now turn to the principle of Formula
Apportionment. Under this taxation principle, the tax bases of the MNE’s subsidiaries
are ﬁrst consolidated and then apportionment to the taxing countries according to a
certain formula. We consider a formula that contains all three apportionment factors
usually employed in practice. More speciﬁcally, the part of the MNE’s consolidated





j F(kj) and payroll share wiℓi/
P
j wjℓj. Denoting by γ, σ and ϕ
the formula weights of these apportionment factors, the share of the consolidated tax
base assigned to country i reads
A











where x−i := (x1,...,xi−1,xi+1,...,xn) for x = k,ℓ,w, and where (γ,σ,ϕ) ∈ {(γ,σ,ϕ)|
(γ,σ,ϕ) ∈ [0,1]3 and γ + σ + ϕ = 1}.
11The MNE’s tax burden in country i is given by tiAi( )
P
j Φj. The MNE’s total
after-tax proﬁt under Formula Apportionment can be written as






















is the eﬀective tax rate of the MNE. Note that in equation (20) we used the property
P
j Aj = 1. The objective of the MNE is to maximize the after-tax proﬁt (19) with
respect to capital, labor and proﬁt shifting taking into account (2), (20) and
P
j sj = 0.
Because tax bases are consolidated, the MNE is not able to reduce its tax liability by
proﬁt shifting. It therefore chooses proﬁt shifting such that the concealment cost
is minimized, i.e. si = 0 for all i. The MNE’s optimal capital and labor demand,


















ℓi + (1 − τ)[Fℓ(ki,ℓi) − wi] = 0. (22)
There are two diﬀerences of these ﬁrst-order conditions to the respective ﬁrst-order con-
ditions (6) and (7) under Separate Accounting. First, under Formula Apportionment
the net-of-tax marginal returns to the input factors are computed with the eﬀective
tax rate τ instead of the national tax rates ti. The reason is consolidation of tax bases.
Second, due to the apportionment mechanism the MNE has ceteris paribus an incen-
tive to invest more and demand more labor in countries with below-average tax burden
than in countries with above-average tax burden. The reason is that, by doing so, the
MNE increases the share of the consolidated tax base assigned to low-tax countries and
reduces the share of the consolidated tax base assigned to high-tax countries so that
its total tax burden falls. This formula manipulation incentive of the MNE is reﬂected
by the ﬁrst term on the LHS of (21) and (22), respectively.
Equations (21) and (22) together with the market clearing conditions (3) and (4)
determine the MNE’s decision and the factor prices as functions of the corporate tax
rates. We again need the comparative static eﬀects of tax rate changes on the economy’s
equilibrium and restrict our attention to symmetric Nash equilibria with equal tax
12rates ti = τ = t. It then follows ki = ¯ k, ℓi = ¯ ℓ, wi = w and Φi = Φ. Moreover, the







ℓi/(n−1) = −(σFℓ/F +ϕ/ℓ)/n2 and Aj
wi = −Ai
wi/(n−1) = −ϕ/(n2w). The

































































for i  = j. The comparative static eﬀects (23) – (26) have the same signs as the
corresponding eﬀects (9) – (11) under Separate Accounting. However, the intuition is
diﬀerent. Under Separate Accounting, the MNE reduces investment in a tax-increasing
country since this lowers the tax base in this country. Such an eﬀect is not present under
Formula Apportionment since taxes fall on the consolidated tax base, so the MNE is
not able to reduce the tax base by reallocating capital between countries. But under
Formula Apportionment the MNE reduces capital demand in a tax-increasing country
since it faces the above mentioned formula manipulation incentive. It reallocates capital
from a tax-increasing country to the other countries since this raises the share of the
consolidated tax base assigned to the other countries. The increase in investment in the
other countries is brought about by a reduction in the world interest rate. Formally,
these eﬀects are captured by (23) and (24). Moreover, the complementarity between
labor and capital implies that labor demand and wages move into the same direction as
investment. This eﬀect is ampliﬁed by the formula manipulation incentive that holds
also with respect to labor and wages.3 Overall, (25) and (26) show that wages in the
tax-increasing country go down while they increase in all other countries.
Tax competition. Under Formula Apportionment tax revenue of a country equals
the share of the MNE’s consolidated tax base assigned to this country multiplied by
3Strictly speaking, the formula manipulation incentive holds with respect to labor and wages only
if the formula contains the sales and/or payroll factors. It holds with respect to investment only if
the formula contains the property and/or sales factors. But in any case, the formula manipulation
incentive will be present at least with respect to one of the input factors.







Country i maximizes (27) with respect to ti taking as given tj for all j  = i. It takes
into account the impact of its policy choice on the MNE’s behavior and the factor
markets. This impact is represented by (23) – (26). The Nash equilibrium of the tax
competition game is constituted by ∂gi/∂ti = 0 for all i. The focus is again on a
symmetric equilibrium with ti = ˆ t. In order to evaluate the eﬃciency properties of the
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According to (28) – (30), the cross country eﬀect of tax rates under Formula Ap-
portionment can be decomposed into two sub-externalities. The ﬁrst is the tax base
externality TE|FA given by (29). The reason for this externality is that an increase
in one country’s tax rate reduces capital demand in this country and, thus, the world
interest rate. As consequence, the MNE’s capital cost falls so that the consolidated tax
base and tax revenue in all countries go up. The tax base externality is always positive.
Remember that under Formula Apportionment reallocating input factors has no eﬀect
on the consolidated tax base and, hence, does not inﬂuence the tax base externality.
However, reallocation has an eﬀect on the apportionment of the consolidated tax base.
If one country increases its tax rate, the MNE shifts capital and labor from this coun-
try to all other countries since it faces the formula manipulation incentive. This raises
the share of the consolidated tax base assigned to the other countries and causes the
formula externality FE|(γ,σ,ϕ) deﬁned in (30). The formula externality is positive, too.
14Since both externalities under Formula Apportionment are positive, we obtain
Proposition 3. Suppose the tax competition game under Formula Apportionment
attains a symmetric Nash equilibrium with ti = ˆ t. Then the equilibrium corporate tax
rate ˆ t is ineﬃciently low.
It is again interesting to compare this insight with the result of previous studies referred
to in the Introduction. Previous authors also derive the formula externality which is
exactly the same as the externality in (30). In contrast, previous studies identify a tax
base externality that is diﬀerent from that in (29). When the interest rate is ﬁxed, an
increase in one country’s tax rate reduces capital and labor demand in this country,
but leaves unaltered the interest rate and factor demand in all other countries.4 Hence,
there is no direct eﬀect on the consolidated tax base and the other countries’ tax revenue
via a decline in the interest rate. In addition, the eﬀects on the consolidated tax base
caused by changes in investment and wages do not cancel out. Only investment and
wages in the tax-increasing country are varied, so the consolidated tax base and tax
revenue of the other countries are now aﬀected by these changes. As consequence, the
tax base externality may be positive or negative, depending on whether the negative
eﬀect of the decline in investment or the positive eﬀect of the fall in wages dominates.
With a ﬁxed interest rate, it is therefore not clear whether tax competition leads to
ineﬃciently low or high corporate tax rates. In contrast, our Proposition 3 shows that
with an endogenous interest rate corporate taxes under Formula Apportionment are
ineﬃciently low since the tax base externality is unambiguously positive.
As for the case of Separate Accounting, we can again show that this conclusion
prevails if the countries become inﬁnitesimally small. By virtually the same proof as
that of Proposition 2, we obtain
Proposition 4. Suppose the tax competition game under Formula Apportionment
attains a symmetric Nash equilibrium with ti = ˆ t. Then Proposition 3 is true also for











When the number of countries becomes very large, the cross country eﬀect of tax
rates between two countries converges to zero. However, the aggregate eﬀect of one
4This argument abstracts from the changes in factor inputs caused by the formula manipulation
incentive since these changes are already reﬂected in the formula externality
15country’s tax rate on all other countries is still positive. This is the reason why we
obtain ineﬃcient undertaxation under Formula Apportionment even if countries are
small. Moreover, if the number of countries grows, more and more countries compete
for mobile capital. As shown by the second part of Proposition 4, it follows that
the equilibrium corporate tax rate under Formula Apportionment is decreasing in the
number of countries. Ineﬃcient undertaxation is therefore more pronounced when there
are many countries than when only a few countries compete for mobile input factors.
The extent of the ineﬃciency under Formula Apportionment depends not only on
the number of countries, but also on the shape of the formula. We therefore now
turn to the comparison of diﬀerent formulas. Remember that TE|FA is independent of
the formula weights (γ,σ,ϕ), so we need to focus on the formula externality (30) only.
Deﬁning Υ := −ˆ tΦ2/[n(1−ˆ t)Fkk] > 0 and considering the extreme cases of the formula
weights, the formula externality can be written as
FE|(1,0,0) = Υ
1
¯ k2, FE|(0,1,0) = Υ
F 2
k




Concavity of the production function implies F > ¯ kFk so that FE|(1,0,0) > FE|(0,1,0).
The other comparisons are not unique, in general. However, for the CES production
function introduced above we obtain F 2
k/F 2 =  2K2/[¯ k2(K + L)2] and −Fkk/(¯ ℓFℓ) =
[(1− )K+(1−ν)L]K/[¯ k2L(K+L)]. These expressions allow the following statement.
Proposition 5. Suppose the tax competition game under Formula Apportionment
attains a symmetric Nash equilibrium with ti = ˆ t. Then
(i) the tax rate under the pure sales formula (γ,σ,ϕ) = (0,1,0) is greater than the tax
rate under the pure capital formula (γ,σ,ϕ) = (1,0,0).
If additionally the production function is of the CES type F(k,ℓ) = [δkν + (1 − δ)ℓν]
µ
ν
with δ ∈]0,1[,   ∈]0,1[ and ν ≤ 1, then
(ii) the tax rate under the pure sales formula (γ,σ,ϕ) = (0,1,0) is greater than the tax
rate under the pure payroll formula (γ,σ,ϕ) = (0,0,1) if ν ≤ 2 −   −  2.
The ﬁrst part of Proposition 5 implies that ineﬃcient undertaxation is less severe if
the formula uses the sales factor instead of the property factor. The reason for this
result is that we assume decreasing returns to scale caused by a third ﬁxed production
factor. Hence, the MNE’s formula manipulation incentive and the associated formula
externality are larger under the property formula than under the sales formula. Under
the property formula, apportionment is targeted directly at the production factors
16whereas under the sales formula the MNE’s manipulation eﬀort is hampered by the
third production factor which cannot be altered by the MNE. Whether the sales formula
is also superior to the payroll formula, however, depends not only on the importance
of the ﬁxed production factor but also on the elasticity of substitution between capital
and labor. Intuitively, apportionment is directed at the production factor also under
the payroll formula. But this factor cannot as easily manipulated as the capital factor
because labor is immobile. Hence, the conditions rendering the sales formula superior
to the payroll formula are stronger than those rendering the sales formula superior to
the property formula. More speciﬁc, capital and labor have to be suﬃciently strong
complements in the sense that ν ≤ 2 −   −  2.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have investigated the eﬃciency properties of corporate income tax-
ation under Separate Accounting and Formula Apportionment. In contrast to the
previous literature, our analysis takes explicitly into account the world capital market
and the world interest rate determined on this market. Such a change in assumptions
turned out to reverse the results obtained in the previous literature. With a ﬁxed
interest rate, Separate Accounting leads to corporate tax rates that are always ineﬃ-
ciently low, while under Formula Apportionment countries may end up with ineﬃcient
overtaxation. In the presence of an endogenous world interest rate, in contrast, it is the
other way round. Under Separate Accounting we obtain an ambiguous result whereas
Formula Apportionment leads to ineﬃciently low tax rates. This conclusion is true
independent of whether countries are large or small.
Our results may have important policy implications. For the Formula Apportion-
ment systems in countries like Germany and Switzerland, one may argue that the ﬁxed
interest rate assumption is suitable since these countries usually take as given the world
interest rate and it also cannot be expected that corporate income taxation in these
countries has a signiﬁcant impact on the world capital market. This is diﬀerent, how-
ever, for the U.S. which is usually seen the largest player in global trade of capital.
Hence, even if the U.S. states do not take into account the eﬀects of their Formula
Apportionment taxation on the world interest rate, such an eﬀect will be present and
important for evaluating the eﬃciency of corporate taxation. Perhaps even more im-
portant, the endogenous interest rate assumption is relevant for the current reform
discussion in the European Union. The European Union, too, is large enough to in-
17ﬂuence the world capital market, even if the individual member countries ignore this
eﬀect. Therefore, the switch from Separate Accounting to Formula Apportionment
may miss the indented aim of mitigating detrimental tax competition. Such a situ-
ation would occur if the present tax rates are close to their eﬃcient levels because
the proﬁt shifting and tax base externalties neutralize each other.5 Then a switch to
Formula Apportionment would be welfare-reducing since it unambiguously reduces the
corporate tax rates below their eﬃcient levels.
Appendix
A. Derivation of (9) – (12). Equations (1) – (4) and (6) – (8) determine r, ki, ℓi
and wi for all i. Inserting (3) into the other equations and diﬀerentiating (6) yields
(1 − t)Fkkdki = (1 − ρt)dr + (Fk − ρr)dti. (A1)
Inserting (A1) in
P







Setting all but one dti equal to zero then proves ∂r/∂ti in (9). Using this result in (A1)
shows (10). From (7) we get dwi = Fℓkdki. Using (10) proves (11). In order to show
(12), totally diﬀerentiate (8). This yields
C
′′dsi = dλ − dti. (A3)
Inserting (A3) in
P
i dsi = 0 from (1) and rearranging terms gives ndλ =
P
i dti. If we
set all but one dti equal to zero, it follows ∂λ/∂ti = 1/n. From (A3), we obtain (12).
B. Proof of Proposition 2. In a symmetric equilibrium, equation (6) reads
(1 − ˜ t)[Fk(¯ k, ¯ ℓ) − ρr] − r(1 − ρ) = 0. (A4)
It determines the equilibrium interest rate r as a function of ˜ t. Note that (A4) does
not contain n, so r does not depend directly on the number of countries n. For a given
5There are a lot of empirical studies showing that corporate tax rates in Europe have declined
over the last decades and that there are strategic interactions between the policies of European coun-
tries, e.g. Devereux et al. (2002, 2008). But note that these studies do not explicitly quantify ﬁscal
externalities and therefore do not allow for judging whether tax rates are ineﬃciently low or high.
18˜ t, equations (15) and (16) then imply
lim
n→∞





(n − 1)TE|SA = −
˜ t(Fk − ρr)[(1 − ρ˜ t)
￿
Fk − ρr − ¯ ℓFℓk
￿
− (1 − ˜ t)ρ¯ kFkk]
(1 − ˜ t)(1 − ρ˜ t)Fkk
T 0.
This proves the ﬁrst part of Proposition 2.
In order to show the second part, note that in a symmetric equilibrium the ﬁrst-
order condition of country i’s revenue maximization can be written as Gi(t1,...,tn,n) :=













ti + (n − 1)Gi
tj where in the latter term
we have j  = i. The sign of this expression can be determined by the stability of
the tax competition game: Stability requires that the Jacobian matrix of the system
Gi(t1,...,tn,n) = 0 for i = 1,...,n is negative semi-deﬁnite. Computing the Jacobian





tj]. This expression has to be positive if n is even and negative if
n is odd. It follows Gi
ti +(n−1)Gi
tj < 0 where we have used Gi
ti < 0 due to the second-
order condition of country i’s tax revenue maximization. Hence, the denominator of
(A5) is negative and the overall sign of d˜ t/dn depends on the sign of Gi
n. To determine
this sign, we explicitly compute Gi(t1,...,tn,n) = ∂gi/∂ti = 0 and apply the symmetry
property. Using (6) – (8) and (9) – (12) yields after some tedious calculations
G
i(˜ t,...,˜ t,n) = F(¯ k, ¯ ℓ) − ¯ ℓFℓ(¯ k, ¯ ℓ) − ρr¯ k + ˜ tρ¯ k
Fk − ρr
1 − ρ˜ t
− (n − 1)(PE + TE|SA) = 0.
The ﬁrst four terms of this expression do not depend on n as we argued above that
r does not directly depend on n. Note also that we can keep ˜ t constant since we are
looking for the partial derivative of Gi( ) with respect to n. Using (15) and (16) it
follows Gi
n = −(PE + TE|SA)/n which inserted into (A5) completes the proof.
C. Derivation of (23) – (26). Totally diﬀerentiating (3) yields dℓi = 0. Inserting
this observation together with (22) in the total diﬀerential of (4), (21) and (22) and












ℓi + (1 − t)Fℓkdki − (1 − t)dwi = 0, (A7)
X
j
dkj = 0. (A8)
From equation (20) and the symmetry assumption we obtain
















































If we set one dtj  = 0 and all others equal to zero, we obtain equation (23). Next,

















Using the expression for A
j
ki in (A13) proves (24). Finally, we rearrange (A7) to































If we use equation (24) and the expression for A
j
ℓi in (A15), we obtain after some
rearrangements equations (25) and (26).
20D. Derivation of (28) – (30). From the deﬁnition of Φj in (2) we obtain




























j(∂wj/∂ti) = 0. Inserting these expres-
sions into (A16) and taking into account (23) proves (29). In order to prove (30), we
diﬀerentiate Aj from (18) to obtain





































where i  = j  = h  = i. In a symmetric equilibrium, we have ∂kh/∂ti = ∂kj/∂ti,
∂wh/∂ti = ∂wj/∂ti, ∂ki/∂ti = −(n − 1)∂kj/∂ti and ∂wi/∂ti = −(n − 1)∂wj/∂ti.




































(γ¯ k + σFk/F)/n and Aj
wj − Aj
wi = −(n − 1)Aj
wi − Aj
wi = −nAj
wi = ϕ/(nw). Making
use of these derivatives, (24) and (26) in (A18) proves (30).
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